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IN THE SUPREME, COUR,T 
,of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, by and through its 
ROAD COMMISSION, C. H. VANCE, 
Chairman, LAYTON MAXFIELD and 
LORENZO J. BOTT. members of the 
STATE ROAD COMNIISSION, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
-vs.-
UNION CONSTRUCTION COMPANY~ 
INC., and the UNITED STATES 
FIDELITY AND GUARANTY COM-
PANY, a corporation, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
Case No. 8816 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
All italics are ours. Parties will be referred to as in 
the Court below. Appellants will be referred to as plain-
tiffs, or the State. Respondent, Union Construction 
Company, Inc., will be referrP-d to as Union. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This appeal is from judgment and decree by the 
Court in favor of defendant and against plaintiff. Ad-
judging that the Bid Bond of defendant, r nion Construc-
tion Company furnished by Lnited States Fidelity and 
Guaranty Company in the sum of $8,650.00 should not be 
forfeited to the State of "Ctah. 
The pleadings and Pretrial Order makes basic dis-
puted issues of fact. 
The basic issues of fact set forth by the Pretrial 
Order were six in number and were as follows: 
1. 
. )
3. 
4. 
Did the State survey two roads as claimed by 
defendant Union Construction Company, Inc., 
and were the stakes for the two roads on the 
ground at the time the employees and agents 
of rnion Construction Company~ Inc., went 
upon the ground for the purpose of making 
their bids ·f 
If onlY one road was staked, where were the 
stakes. upon tl1e ground at the time when the 
Union Construction Con1pa.ny·. Inc.., went upon 
the ground for the purpose of making its bid1 
Did the l T nion Construction Cmnpa.ny. Inc., 
make a mistake of faet as to where the road 
would be constructed f 
1 r ~n. did the Union Construction Company 
act as a n~asonahly prudent person in making 
such 1nistake 1 
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I!; 
5. 
6. 
3 
What amount of damage did plaintiff sustain 
as a result of the failure of Union Construc-
tion Company to accept its contract~ 
Did the plaintiff place any stakes upon the 
ground after the plans and specifications were 
prepared and submitted to the various bid-
ders~ 
At the time of trial the State stipulated that if the 
Bond was not forfeited that it would not attempt to show 
any damage whatsoever and that it was an all or nothing 
proposition as far as the State was concerned. It would 
be entitled to the full amount of the bond, or it would 
be entitled to no judgment. R. 22. 
The evidence presented by defendant supported the 
position which the Pretrial Order outlined. 
Plaintiff's own witnesses testified that on three sepa-
rate occasions the road had been staked in the vicinity. 
The first staking occurred in 1946. R. 77. The second 
staking occurred in 1954. R. 91. The third staking occur-
red in 1956 and immediately prior to the time that de-
fendants' employees visited the area for the purpose 
of examining the terrain so that a bid could be made. 
R.87. 
Exhibits 9 to 13 are photographs of the area involved 
and show stakes being pointed out after the <'omd nwt ion 
project was completed which were in place prior to t liP 
commencement of the construction project. Th<>~<' ~takP~ 
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were those which employees of Union mistook for the 
proper stakes which marked the course of the highway. 
The area was relatively flat where the stake ex-
amined by Union placed the road. The unclassified ex-
cavation work would have involved the handling of only 
loose and relatively soft dirt. Exhibit No. 10 shows that 
the course followed by the State in the actual construc-
tion of the road placed the road to the north far enough 
that it traversed a solid rock ridge extending down into 
the valley. The difference between excavation in rock 
such as is shown by Exhibit No. 10 and soft earth makes 
the material cost difference. 
The bid openings at the State occurred on the lOth 
of September. After noticing the great difference be-
tween the other bids on unclassified excavation and the 
bid of Union, the employes of Union becan1e very much 
alarmed. They immediately left for the site of the pro-
posed road construction. They examined the site. On 
the morning of the 12th of September Union notified 
the Road Commission that there had been a mistake 1nade. 
Union also, on September 13th, wrote the State that it 
could not follow through on its bid. The State then 
awarded the contract to the next lowest bidder. 
No additional advertising or delays were necessi-
tated as result of the refusal by Union to accept the con-
tract on which they had bid. 
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The Findings of Fact by the Court point out that 
the difference between the Morrison-Knudsen Company 
bid and Union Construction company bid was $35,380.62, 
and was primarily the difference between the bid for 
unclassified excavation made by Morrison-Knudsen Com-
pany and the bid for unclassified excavation made by 
Union Construction Company. 
The Court found that there were two sets of stakes 
in the area, one to the south of where the road actually 
was constructed and that the agents of Union mistakenly 
followed the stakes that were south of the true stakes. 
The Court found that the agents of Union acted 
in a reasonable manner, and were not negligent in follow-
ing the wrong set of stakes; that there was nothing in 
the vicinity to indicate and put them on notice that they 
were following the wrong set of stakes. The Court further 
found that the mistake was an honest mistake and that the 
agents of Union believed the stakes they followed were 
the true markers of the roadway. 
The Court found that the notification by Union of 
the mistake occurred prior to the formal offer of contract 
made by the State to Union on September 24, 1956. 
The Court concluded Union had made a bona fide 
mistake of a fundamental character in calculating the bid; 
that the mistake was not the result of any negligence on 
the part of defendant but was due to the fact that there 
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was present in the vicinity where the road was to be con-
structed two separate sets of stakes, either one of which 
defendant could, in the exercise of ordinary care, follow 
and believe marked the site of the road to be constructed. 
The Court concluded also that the forfeiture should not 
be permitted; that to require forfeiture under the facts 
and circumstances would be inequitable and unfair and 
would create an intolerable burden not required by law. 
In accordance with the Findings of Fact and Con-
clusions of Law the Court entered the Decree that Enion 
be permitted to withdraw its bid and that the State re-
turn to Union the Bond which had been deposited to 
guarantee performance of the bid. 
The Statement of Facts set forth in brief of appellant 
contains several quotes and references which are most 
favorable to it. The evidence to the contrary of that 
quoted is contained in the record and is set forth in part 
in this Brief. 
STATEniEXT OF POIXTS 
POINT I 
WHERE A MISTAKE IN CALCULATING A BID IS 
FUNDAMENTAL IN CHARACTER AND NOT DUE TO 
GROSS NEGLIGENCE FORFEITURE OF BID BONDS WILL 
NOT BE PERMITTED BY A COURT OF EQUITY. 
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POINT II 
THE EVIDENCE SUPPORTS THE TRIAL COURT'S 
FINDING THAT UNION WAS NOT NEGLIGENT, BUT MADF 
AN HONEST MATERIAL MISTAKE CONCERNING THE 
PROPER MARKINGS FOR THE PROPOSED ROADWAY. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
WHERE A MISTAKE IN CALCULATING A BID IS 
FUNDAMENTAL IN CHARACTER AND NOT DUE TO 
GROSS NEGLIGENCE FORFEITURE OF BID BONDS WILL 
NOT BE PERMITTED BY A COURT OF EQUITY. 
Equitable relief will be granted a bidder for public 
contract where he has made a material mistake of fact in 
the bid which he submitted, and upon the discovery of that 
mistake, acts promptly in informing the public authorities 
and requesting withdrawal of his bid, or opportunity 
to rectify his mistake, particularly where he does so be-
fore any formal contract is entered into. This general 
rule is without dissent in the cases and has been recog-
nized generally in all areas of the United States. 
The trial court, in its memo decision R. 99 relied upon 
and quoted the general rule. It cited the Michigan case of 
Kutsche v. Ford, 222 Mich. 442, 192 N.W. 714. It quoted 
from the decision of the Michigan Supreme Court which 
reads as follows: 
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"Where a mistake is of so fundamental a 
character that the minds of the parties have never, 
in fact, met, or where an unconscionable advantage 
has been gained by mere mistake or misappre-
hension, and there was no gross negligence on the 
part of the plaintiff, either in falling into the error 
or in not sooner claiming redress, and no inter-
vening rights have accrued, and the parties may 
still be placed in statu quo, equity will interfere 
in its discretion, to prevent intolerable injustice." 
In the K utsche case the Michigan Supreme Court 
examined carefully the proposition that to permit the 
bidder to withdraw his bid would cause damage to the 
State and result in the public work costing more than it 
should, and answered the claim of the State in the follow-
ing language : 
"In the instant case it may be thought that the 
school district cannot be said to be placed in statu 
quo when it is considered that the building cost 
nearly $6,000 more than plaintiff's bid. To place 
in statu quo does not mean that one shall profit out 
of the mistake of another. It does not appear that 
plaintiff's mistake has n1ade the school building 
cost more than it otherwise would have cost. The 
school district, if placed back where it was before 
the bid, loses nothing except what it seeks to gain 
out of plaintiff's nlistake. To compel plaintiff to 
forfeit his deposit, because of his 1uistake, would 
permit the school district to lessen the proper cost 
of the school building at the expense of plaintiff, 
and that, in equit~~. is no reason at all for refusing 
plain tiff relief." Page 717. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
9 
Respondent has examined all of the cases it has 
been able to discover which have a bearing on the funda-
mental proposition argued by the State in its first point, 
and can find no support for the state's position. It will 
be noted that the State cites no authority for the proposi-
tion that the State Road Commission could not permit 
the withdrawal of the bid where there has been a material 
mistake of fact made by the bidder. 
The United States Supreme Court has had an occa-
sion to pass upon the proposition. It set forth the general 
rule in the case of Moffatt, Hodgkins, & Clarke Company 
v. City of Rochester, 178 U.S. 373, 44 L. Ed. 1108, 20 S. 
Ct. 957. The opinion dated May 21, 1900 was written by 
Mr. Justice McKenna. The case has been cited many 
times and has become known as the case of the near-
sighted engineer. The near-sighted engineer made two 
mistakes in calculating the bid. One mistake involved 
writing the figure of 70c as 50c. The other involved writ-
ing the sun1 of $15.00 as $1.50. The Supreme Court of 
the United States carefully considered the near-sighted 
engineer's mistakes and set down the legal principles 
which would seem to be applicable to the present set of 
facts. The following quotes outline the Court's reason-
ing: 
"There was no doubt of the mistake, and 
there was a prompt declaration of it as soon as it 
was discovered and before the city had done any-
thing to alter its condition. Indeed, according to 
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the testimony of one witness, the clerk of the board 
before the mistake was declared by complainanfs 
engineer expressed the thought that 50 cents per 
cubic yard for earth excavation was too low, and 
there was some discussion about it at the time, but 
Mr. Aldridge (he was chairman of the board) 
said he (the clerk) might as well go on and read it, 
as the bid was informal. The reading proceeded, 
and subsequently the Board let the work on con-
tract No. 1 to Jones & Son, and accepted complain-
ant's proposals containing the mistakes for the 
work on line B, contract No. 2, although complain-
ant protested that there was a mistake in the price 
of earth excavation and also in tunnel excavation. 
This was inequitable, even though it ·was impelled 
by what was supposed to be the commands of the 
charter. It offered or forced complainant the 
alternative of taking the contract at an unremun-
erative price, or, the payment of $90,000 as liqui-
dated damages. We do not think such course was 
the command of the statute or the board's duty." 
"If the defendants are correct in their conten-
tion there is absolutely no redress for a bidder for 
public work, no matter how aggravated or palp-
able his blunder. !The moment his proposal is 
opened by the executive board he is held as in a 
grasp of steel. There is no remedy, no escape. 
If, through an error of his clerk, he has agreed to 
do work worth $1,000,000 for $10, he n1ust be held 
to the strict letter of his contract. while equity 
stands by with folded hands and sees hin1 driven 
into bankruptcy. The defendants' position admits 
of no compromise, no exception, no 1niddle ground. 
"These remarks are so apposite and just it 
is difficult to add to them. The transactions had 
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not reached the degree of a contract - a proposal 
and acceptance. Nor was the bid withdrawn or 
canceled against the provision of the charter. A 
clerical error was discovered in it and declared, 
and no question of the error was then made or of 
the good faith of complainant." 
There are numerous cases which have been decided 
since the cases cited herein. One of the most recent is 
Puget Sound Painters, Inc. v. The State of Washington, 
et al., 45 Wash. 2d 819,278 P. 2d 302. The Supreme Court 
of Washington set down the general rule applicable where 
a painter made a mistake in calculating its bid in the 
following language: 
"* * * that equity will relieve against forfeit-
ure of a bid bond, (a) if the bidder acted in good 
faith, and (b) without gross negligence, (c) if he 
was reasonably prompt in giving notice of the 
error in the bid to the other party, (d) if the 
bidder will suffer substantial detriment by forfeit-
ure, and (e) if the other party's status has not 
greatly changed, and relief from forfeiture will 
work no substantial hardship on him." 
Apparently, it is the position of appellant that, as 
matter of law, Union was grossly negligent and that for-
feiture regardless of care or negligence must be required 
under the State Road Commission rules and regulations. 
The general rule of law recited herein has been the 
subject of several annotations and is set forth in the 
general text writers. See 59 ALR 827, 80 ALR 586, 107 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
12 
ALR 1451, 126 ALR 837. LRA 1915A P. 229, 43 Am. Jur. 
805, 81 CJS Section 116, p. 1095. 
It is respectfully submitted that the general rule is 
where a mistake in calculating a bid is fundamental in 
character and not due to gross negligence, forfeiture of 
bid bond will not be permitted by a court of equity. 
POINT II 
THE EVIDENCE SUPPORTS THE TRIAL COURT'S 
FINDING THAT UNION WAS NOT NEGLIGENT, BUT MADE 
AN HONEST MATERIAL MISTAKE CONCERNING THE 
PROPER MARKINGS FOR THE PROPOSED ROADWAY. 
The trial court specifically found that there were two 
sets of stakes on the area over which the roadway was to 
pass. The agents of Union mistakenly followed the 
southernmost set of stakes and believed at the time they 
made their bid that the road was to be constructed over 
a relatively smooth loose dirt type of Inaterial, when as an 
actual fact the roadway as staked to the north passed 
through solid rock and greatly increased the cost of 
handling unclassified excavation. 
The evidence adequately supports the trial court's 
finding. The State's own witnesses testified that the road 
had been staked on three different occasions. The pic-
tures taken prior to trial show, without dispute, the exist-
ence of stakes to the south of the stakes which marked 
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the road as constructed. In addition to the old stakes, 
at the time Glenn examined the road area on behalf of 
Union he discovered on the banks of the wash a red flag 
in line with the old stakes which he was following. The 
situation which the evidence discloses was one calculated 
to mislead a person examining the area if he became in-
volved with the old stakes on the area. 
The Plans and Specifications were picked up from 
the State on the 31st day of August, 1956, on 
the 2nd of September, 1956, the agents of Union were on 
the road project examining the area. Glenn, who ex-
amined the area on behalf of Union, testified that he had 
in his car, at the site of the project, the Plans and Speci-
fications for the road project; that as he got out to ex-
amine the site of the road, the plans were left in his car 
(R. 48). Glenn testified that one of the things which was 
misleading was the red flag on the bank of the wash in 
line with the old stakes. \Vhen questioned about the red 
flag one of the engineers at the road project site said: 
"Well, I guess I should have pulled it." 
The great disparity between the bid of Union Con-
struction Company and the bid of Morrison-Knudsen 
Company for the unclassified excavation work demon-
strates that Glenn had made a basic miscalculation. The 
unclassified excavation item was the only one in which 
there was such a wide disparity between the bidders. 
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The State did not produce any evidence refuting or 
contradicting the testimony of Glenn concerning the basic 
mistake which he made in calculating the cost of doing the 
unclassified excavation. It did not produce any evidence 
refuting or contradicting Glenn concerning the existence 
of the red flag and the line of stakes leading to it at the 
job site. The Court accepted the testimony of Union's 
witnesses and found that there had been a material mis-
take made which was without negligence on the part of 
Union and that the equitable powers of the Court required 
it to relieve Union of the forfeiture required by the State 
Road Commission Rules and Regulations. 
The State was not damaged in any way. The evi-
dence reveals that Union employees became alarmed 
immediately following the bid opening and proceeded 
back to the road project site to re-examine the area to 
ascertain if there had been some kind of a mistake. The 
bid openings were on the lOth of Septen1ber. Glenn was 
back at the job site on the 11th of September. The nlorn-
ing of the 12th of September, a call ·was 1nade by ~Irs. 
Glenn to the State Road Com1nission, and it was informed 
that there had been a 1nistake. That the Union Construc-
tion Company desired to withdraw its bid. On September 
13th, a letter was written to the Co1nn1ission by Counsel 
for Respondent informing the Conunission of the 1nistake, 
outlining the nature of the mistake, and notifying the 
Commission that Union would not be able to sign a con-
tract and undertake the work for the bid price. The 
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Commission re-awarded the bid to Morrison-Knudsen 
Company and the project was actually constructed. 
There is no dispute concerning the unequivocal with-
drawal of the bid by Union upon discovering the mistake 
which it had made. The second leg of the general rule 
quoted herein under Point I was thus complied with. 
Prompt notification of the mistake was given. The State 
of Utah suffered no damage by reason of the fact that 
Union had made a mistake in calculating the bid. 
The State, in its brief, claims that Glenn did not take 
the plans to the site of the job when he examined it on 
the first occasion, prior to the making of the bid. This, 
as has been demonstrated, is not so. The Plans and 
specifications were in his car and he had had an oppor-
tunity to examine them before going to the site to exam-
ine the roadway itself. 
The evidence is clear that where there is a dis-
crepancy between plans and the road as staked, the actual 
staking on the physical site must be the determinative 
factor in making the bid. 
Glenn had had many years of experience in making 
construction bids. The area over which the road was 
constructed, as demonstrated by the pictures, was an area 
covered with sage brush, cheat grass, russian thistle and 
other types of vegetation. All of these facts, the Court 
could well consider, in determining that Glenn was not 
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negligent in following the wrong set of stakes when he 
examined the site for the road construction work. 
Respondent is unable to find any evidence which 
would justify a claim that, as matter of law, respondent 
Union and its employees were negligent. 
The mistake was made, and it is respectfully sub-
mitted, as a practical matter, it is conceded, it was a 
material mistake and would justify the Court in exer-
cising its equitable powers and ordering the return of the 
Bond to Union. 
It is respectfully submitted that the evidence sup-
ports the trial court's finding that Union was not negli-
gent but made an honest material mistake concerning the 
site of the proposed road. 
CONCLUSION 
It is respectfully submitted that this Court should 
affirm the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and 
Decree as made by the trial court and dismiss the appeal. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ROBERT \V. HrGHES 
Counsel for Respondent 
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